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The drivers of global value chain (GVC) participation
in EU member states
Ines Kersan-Skabic
Faculty of Economics and Tourism “Dr. Mijo Mirkovic”, Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Pula, Croatia
ABSTRACT
Integration within the EU single market increases the interconnec-
tion and interdependence of the EU economies. Global value
chain (GVC) participation has become one of the most widely
used indicators to measure the dispersion of the production pro-
cess among different countries. The EU member states rate differ-
ently in the GVC participation index. The highest participation is
in Luxembourg and Slovakia and the lowest is in Croatia. The aim
of this paper is to identify the most important variables that influ-
ence the GVC participation index in the EU member states (EU-15
and EU new member states). The research employs dynamic
panel data (GMM) methodology. The obtained results are very
similar for the EU-15 and EU-NMS indicating that the most
important drivers of GVC participation are: GDP growth, lag GVC
participation, FDI, development of financial sector, share of serv-
ices in GDP and share of high-tech products in export, and level
of wages. However, the indicators and strength of the influence
of some of these variables differ between the two groups
of countries.
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Global value chains (GVCs) are the result of the fragmentation of production and
processing segmentation in many phases or processes that take place in numerous
locations in different countries. In this way, they have contributed to the increasing
interconnection between nations. Multinational companies have greatly contributed
to the dispersion of production and, as a result, the shares of intermediates’ export
and import have increased in gross trade and this trade distorts or shades the real
contribution of each individual country to the export. As a consequence, the concept
of “trade in value added” was developed to indicate the domestic and foreign value
added components in gross export. Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) provide an
overview of GVC development and its name change, Taglioni and Winkler (2016)
provide a comprehensive study about the role of GVCs in economic development
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and Hernandez and Pedersen (2017) provide a review of the concepts, activities, con-
figuration, geographical scope, coordination and implication of GVCs.
The most well-known measure of a country’s position in GVCs was created by
Koopman et al. (2010) who introduced the GVC participation index. This index is calcu-
lated by summarising the domestic value added in foreign export (forward participation)
and foreign value added in domestic export (backward participation). The value goes
from 0 to 100. The higher the value, the higher the country’s participation in GVC, i.e.,
trade in intermediate products is more prevalent in total trade and the production process
is more fragmented.
The EU member states have different values of GVC participation. Luxembourg
and Slovakia have the highest participation, and Croatia has the lowest. The values
range from 35 to 70. Some of the EU new member states have achieved very good
interconnection with foreign partners, i.e., Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, and
they have GVC participation in line with, or even higher than, the EU-15. On the
other hand, there are countries with weak performances in GVC participation, i.e.,
Croatia and Cyprus that have not reached high values of GVC participation and are
lagging behind (OECD-TiVA, 2017). In this paper, we will try to find out the causes
of different values of GVC participation.
While there are papers that deal with the level of GVC participation of different
countries and groups of countries, the motivation for doing this research derived
from the fact that there is a lack of studies that examine the most influential factors
concerning the different levels of GVC participation among countries. The determi-
nants of GVC participation or origins of value added in export arise from those
which explain the trade and investments flows. It is known that reducing tariffs and
other trade barriers, the level of economic freedom, macroeconomic stability, a
favourable business environment (level of wages, tax burden), technological develop-
ment, and enlargement of the EU all have an influence on the mentioned variables.
In this paper, we will perform an analysis with the aim of finding the main deter-
minants/drivers of the different levels of GVC participation of EU member states. We
will perform analysis applying econometric tools and covering the EU as a whole, but
also with the EU divided into two groups: EU-15 and EU-new member states (EU-
NMS). The models include the following variables: GDP per capita; GDP growth
rates; institutional development (economic freedom variables); wages; investment in
research and development; financial development; shares of services in GDP; share of
high-technology export in total export; and FDI intensity (market integration). The
data are from Eurostat, the World Bank and the OECD- TiVA database.
The novelty of this paper is in the extension of existing researches by focusing not
just on the presentation and discussion of the GVC participation index (or total or
industrial level), but also on the quantitative analysis of possible variables that influ-
ence it. While research carried out by Orlic (2017) includes determinants of GVC
participation on the micro (firm) level, the idea here is to include the variables of the
national economy (macroeconomic data). Additionally, the analysis in this paper is
oriented to finding out differences in the determinants of GVC participation among
the EU member states (with separate analysis for the EU-15 and EU new mem-
ber states).
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The results could be useful for countries’ future activities in terms of where they
see their position in GVCs with the aim of better exploiting the benefits of produc-
tion fragmentation.
The paper is structured in the following way: the second chapter comprises the
overview of the literature, the third chapter includes methodology, data and results of
the analysis, and the fourth chapter presents the conclusion.
2. Literature review
The GVC literature is mainly focused on the level of countries’ participation or pos-
ition in GVCs. This analysis is made through the research of trade in value added
(TiVA) that refers not to the gross trade but to the contribution of every particular
country (value added) to domestic (or foreign) exports. Although the concept of glo-
bal value chain activities should refer to the global dispersion of production, the fact
is that there are three regional hubs of GVC activities: Asia, North America
and Europe.
Koopman et al. (2010), Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Stehrer et al. (2012) sug-
gested the measures of GVC participation and GVC position. It is necessary to differ-
entiate between backward and forward participation, where the former refers to the
share of foreign value added in domestic export and the latter refers to the domestic
value added in partners’ exports. The value created by a GVC is unevenly distributed
among participants/countries and depends on their ability to supply sophisticated and
hard-to-imitate products or services to GVCs. The existing literature is focused on
the analysis of GVC participation or position. The EU as a whole, or selected EU
members, are analysed, among others, by Amador, Cappariello and Stehrer (2015),
Leitner and Stehrer (2014), Cieslik, Bieganska and Sroda-Murawska (2016), Grodzicki
and Geodecki (2016), Timmer et al. (2013), Timmer et al. (2016).
Amador, Cappariello and Stehrer (2015) found that in 2011 GVCs for the euro-
area members (taken as a whole) were very important (as important as in China and
more important than in the U.S. and Japan). The high relevance of GVCs in the euro
area, measured by the share of foreign value added in exports, is accompanied by
their comparatively stronger resilience in the face of trade collapse. Also, they found
substantial heterogeneity between countries in the evolution of GVCs from 2000
to 2011.
Leitner & Stehrer (2014) found that vertical specialisation intensified in most of
the EU new member states and that stronger participation in global production proc-
esses is performance enhancing. Their results indicate that export growth and the
degree of vertical specialisation tend to reinforce each other. Cieslik, Bieganska and
Sroda-Murawska (2016) have applied complex methods to get the position of a coun-
try in the downstream or upstream part of GVCs. They found mixed results for the
EU new member states (post-socialist countries) – countries that have stronger links
with Western European countries are more integrated, and most of the exporters
from Central and Eastern Europe are positioned in the downstream part of the pro-
duction process. In addition, they found the highest internationalisation in transport
equipment and electronics where some of the countries were among the global
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leaders in the upstream segment. Grodzicki and Geodecki (2016) explain the core-per-
iphery model in Europe based on the contribution of particular groups of countries to
the value chain. They warn that GVC participation accelerates deindustrialisation proc-
esses and that the CEE countries are in a better position than the Southern countries,
but this is due their continued dependence on foreign capital and technologies.
Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) provide statistical analysis of some features of
GVCs: importing-to-produce (I2P), importing to export (I2E) and value added trade
(VAT). I2P includes intermediate imports used in all sectors and I2E which captures
the content of imported inputs in exported goods and services. An important refine-
ment of the I2E concept is value-added trade that eliminates the double counting of
intermediate trade flows.
Regarding the determinants of GVC participation, Amador and Cabral (2016)
summarise general drivers (and measuring) of GVC participation such as: lowering
the trade and investments costs, trade and investment liberalisation, regional trade
blocs (integration), EU enlargement, and technological development.
Hillberry (2011) emphasised the integration in the world economy of new coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and East Asia as important sources of growth in the inter-
national production fragmentation. Technological development played an inevitable
role in the dispersion of production process, where it includes: reducing transporta-
tion costs, increasing use of ICT technology, internet users, availability and trade in
services (Blinder, 2006; Amiti and Wei, 2005, Abramovsky and Griffith, 2006;
DFAIT, 2011; Hillberry, 2011). Kowalski et al. (2015) have researched the determi-
nants of backward and forward participation and they have included structural and
institutional variables that include: market size (GDP), the share of trade covered by
regional/preferential trade agreements, FDI openness, share of manufacturing in
GDP, distance to closest manufacturing hub, distance to economic activity, popula-
tion and also policy variables (tariffs, intellectual property protection). They found
mixed results of share of manufacturing in GDP and GDP-negative influence in the
case of backward participation and positive impact in the case of forward participa-
tion; population has negative impact in both cases and FDI openness has a positive
impact but just for backward participation. Van der Marel (2015) has also researched
the variables that have an influence on GVC participation, grouping them in three
groups: structural forces and endowments (market size, GDP, GDP per capita, popu-
lation, availability of capital); traditional trade and regulatory barriers (trading across
borders, doing business, trade enabling, barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to
investments, etc.); and new issue areas (FDI restrictions, financial credit availability,
labour market efficiency, innovation climate, R&D investments, etc.). He found the
positive impact of GDP per capita and the negative impact of market size (popula-
tion), FDI restrictions, trading across borders on backward participation.
The relationship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs is discussed by
Antras and Staiger (2012), Baldwin (2008), and WTO (2011). Baldwin (2012) explains
the development of supply-chain trade and found it very regionalised, supported by a
combination of deep regional trade agreements (RTAs), bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) and unilateral reforms by developing countries, mostly accomplished outside
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2015) found that
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the coefficient of the interaction term between depth of preferential trade agreement
and participation in GVCs is consistently positive and significant across specifications
and using different variables of depth and provisions. They conclude that deep prefer-
ential trade agreements have a larger impact on GVC-intensive sectors. Ruta (2017)
introduced a trust dilemma (or a coordination game) that characterises the relation-
ship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs where countries can choose
between four different strategies that go from a situation of no preferential trade
agreement and no participation in GVCs (national production and no agreements) to
GVCs and deep integration.
Hoekman (2014) indicates the heterogeneity in GVC participation is largely
caused by persistent heterogeneity in trade costs, which are determined by a coun-
try’s connectivity among domestic markets and with international markets. He
also found that determinants of a country’s extent of GVC participation are its
skills and technological capacity and the protection of foreign assets.
Kaminski and Ng (2005) focused their research on the network trade in Central
and Eastern European countries and found it underwent important changes (from
2002): there is a shift from simple assembly operations to processing and local pro-
duction of parts and an expansion beyond EU markets.
The OECD (2013) showed that the highest level of value creation in a GVC is
often found in upstream activities such as new concept development, R&D or the
manufacture of key parts and components and in downstream activities such as mar-
keting, branding or customer service. It found that a larger stock of knowledge based
capital stimulates larger value-added in exports, but it is also found that the coeffi-
cient for economic competencies appears to be the largest and most significant
among all three subgroups. Countries with higher investment in R&D and rich with
knowledge-based capital can be expected to achieve significantly more value added in
industries with high knowledge intensity than in those with low knowledge intensity
and consequently high GVC participation.
Nunn (2007) also found that countries with higher intangible capital investment
have relatively higher DVA in knowledge intensive industries. Corrado, et al. (2012)
explain the coverage of intangible assets. It includes: computerised information; soft-
ware and databases; innovative property; R&D; design; product development in finan-
cial services; mineral exploration and spending on the production of artistic originals
and economic competencies; market research; advertising: training; organisational
capital (own account and purchased). Vrh (2016) focused on the drivers of domestic
value added in export in EU member states and found different determinants where
she pointed out intangible capital investments in high knowledge intensive sectors
(especially investments in economic competencies).
From this review, we can summarise that there are different determinants of GVC
participation, some authors pointed out trade costs which in the case of the EU-15
are of less importance because there are no trade costs for intra-EU trade but can be
of importance for the countries that became EU members in the last decade (2004 or
2007). Some authors indicated the relevance of investment in research and develop-
ment, innovation, and a skilled and highly-educated workforce, so the intention is to
include indicators in our analysis that reflect the mentioned determinants.
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3. Research
3.1. Data and methodology
The above discussion indicates that there are many possible determinants of a coun-
try’s integration in GVCs. We decided to calculate drivers for GVC participation for
EU-28, EU-15 and EU-NMS separately. The variables that are included in the analysis
are:
The dependent variable is the GVC participation index. It is calculated from the
OECD TiVA database using the following model proposed by Koopman et.al (2010).
The GVC participation index is a sum from backward and forward linkages in
GVC.
GVC participation ¼ DVA=EXP þ FVA=EXP (1)
where DVA is the share of domestic value added (intermediate export) in foreign
export, EXP is gross export, FVA is the share of foreign value added (intermediate
import) in domestic exports. The data for DVA and FVA are taken from OECD
(2017) and GVC participation is calculated by the authors following the formula (1).
Independent variables are:
 GDP growth and GDP per capita as indicators of level of development and eco-
nomic potential. GDP growth rates are annual growth rates (in %), and GDP per
capita is in constant prices in EUR. The expected influence of these two variables
is positive.
 Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) is an indicator of innovation. The source of
data is Eurostat. We expect the positive impact of this variable on GVC participa-
tion. The assumption is that with the higher level of investment in R&D more
sophisticated production will arise and increase, and from the existing research
such sectors are more involved in GVCs (Javorsek and Camacho, 2015; Cieslik,
Bieganska and Sroda-Murawska, 2016; Taglioni, and Winkler, 2016, Hernandez
and Pedersen, 2017).
 Nominal wages are important as a location advantage for the attraction of foreign
direct investments. Their influence can be negative (higher wages – low GVC par-
ticipation) in the case of EU new member states, but also positive for most devel-
oped EU member states that are specialised in high-technology production that
depends on specific knowledge and skills and where the wages are high.
 Liberalisation of trade and a business-friendly environment are crucial for increas-
ing GVC participation. We have included the variable property rights freedom
(PRF, as an indicator of guarantee of a foreign investor’s rights/assets), and tax
burden (TB) as an indicator of tax costs.1 Here we also wanted to include data on
the FDI restrictiveness index but the data were not available for the entire period.
The data for PRF and TB are from the Heritage Foundation (2017) and they are
part of the group indicator Economic Freedom.
 Profit tax rates are important as a determinant of FDI attractiveness. We included the
data for 2003–2011 due to their availability. The data are from the World Bank data-
base (World Bank, 2017).
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 Financial development is important as the financial system is a provider of capital
for businesses and we have included the variable domestic credit provided by the
financial sector (% GDP) from the World Bank Global Financial Development
Database. We expect the positive impact of this variable.
 The existing literature indicates that the production process is not fragmented to
the same extent in all sectors and some authors find the highest value of GVC
participation for optical products, transport equipment and electronic devices. To
cover such kinds of products, we included the variable share of high-tech products
in gross export and the expected impact is positive.
 The level of GVC participation is different for manufacturing and the service sec-
tor, where the service sector is less integrated in GVCs. We included the data for
share of services value added in GDP; the data are from Eurostat. The expected
impact is negative.
 Foreign direct investments (FDI) should also contribute to GVC participation and
we included different variables to measure its influence: FDI inward stock; FDI
outward stock (in GDP); FDI inflows; FDI outflows (in GDP); and the variable
FDI intensity (average shares of inward and outward FDI in GDP). The source for
the variables is UNCTAD (2018), and the data for FDI intensity is from Eurostat.
The panel data method will be used as the sample has a cross-sectional dimension,
represented by countries (i¼ 1;: : : ; N), and a longitudinal dimension, represented by
a time series (t¼ 1;: : : ; T periods) (Hsiao, 2003). The sample comprises unbalanced
panel data, i.e., there are some periods missing from some units in the population of
interest. In this paper, we chose to perform dynamic panel data to overcome the limi-
tations of static panel analysis. The application of dynamic models is driven by the
nature of the relation that we are investigating and the dynamic aspects of their
adjustment. Estimation with the dynamic model allows the dynamics of the underly-
ing processes, which can be crucial in obtaining consistent estimates of the remaining
parameters (Bond, 2002). The model is estimated using System GMM developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and implemented the xta-
bond2 user written command in STATA 14 (Roodman, 2009).
Turning the lagged dependent variable, except that which alleviates rigidity in the
adjustment, also reduces the problem of omitted variables. The dynamic model is
defined in the following form:
Yit ¼ dYit1 þ kXit þ eit
eit ¼ gi þ ct þ uit (1)
Yit refers to the dependent variable that is also included with time lags (GVC
participation index), Xit is the vector of independent variables for country i at
time t, and eit is the error term that includes country- and time-specific attributes.
The endogeneity problem that can appear in the static analysis is overcome by
applying the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation using instrumental
variables. Considering other characteristics and advantages of the GMM estimators,
the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator is used in this research. To
check the validity of the set of instruments used in the GMM estimation, we applied
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the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Another spe-
cification test is the over-identification that may be caused by the number of instru-
ments that exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated. The Sargan (1958) test
of restrictions is applied to check the validity of the set of instruments.
3.2. Results
Quantitative analysis is presented in Tables 1-3. We performed analysis for the EU28,
EU-15 and EU-new member states (EU-NMS). The data cover the period 1995–2011,
because the last available data for trade in value-added are for 2011.
We include one lag of the dependent (predetermined) variable and two lags for
independent (endogenous) variables.2 The diagnostic test of the majority of models
reported at the end of the table pointed in favour of the hypothesis of proper identifi-
cation: m1 statistics, which measure the first order autocorrelation, are negative and
Table 1. Panel data analysis –gmm estimation (GVC participation¼ dependent variable), EU-28.
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All models include constant variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. P statistically significant at 1%.P statistically significant at 5%.P statistically significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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significant, and the m2 statistics, which measure the second-order autocorrelation,
are not significant. Moreover, the null hypothesis of the Sargan test could not be
rejected. This means that the instruments used are not correlated with the errors and
can be used in the model.
Table 1 refers to determinants of GVC participation in the EU-28. As was expected
the strongest and most significant positive influence on GVC participation is the vari-
able log GDP per capita, as well as lag of the dependent variable. The GDP growth
rate has a weaker but also significant and positive impact. The level of wages, prop-
erty rights, tax burden, investment in research and development have no significant
impacts. The variable FDI intensity has a positive and significant impact. The variable
private credit has a positive impact on GVC participation which is in accordance
with our expectation – better financial conditions are in line with the development of
international business and consequently an increase in GVC participation. Share of
services in GDP has a negative and significant impact, while the share of high tech
export in gross export is not a significant variable. Regarding the influence of FDI on
GVC participation we tried with different variables (stock or flows, or intensity) and
Table 2. Panel data analysis –GMM estimation (GVC participation¼ dependent variable), EU-15.
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All models include constant variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. P statistically significant at 1%.P statistically significant at 5%.P statistically significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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we found the variables FDI inflows or FDI intensity have a positive impact while FDI
stock (inward or outward) have an insignificant impact.
In the EU-15 (Table 2) the following variables have a positive and significant
impact: lag of dependent variable, log GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, share of
services in GDP, private credit provided by financial sector. Wages and profit tax
rates have a negative impact. FDI intensity has a very weak positive impact in models
2 and 5, while FDI inward stock has a negative influence on GVC participation.
Investment in R&D and property rights is not significant.
In the EU-NMS (Table 3), lag of dependent variable, GDP growth rates, invest-
ment in R&D, FDI inward stock, FDI intensity, share of high-tech products in export,
and property rights have a positive impact on GVC participation. The variables of
Table 3. Panel data analysis –GMM estimation (GVC participation¼ dependent variable), EU-
NMS (13).
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private credit and share of services in GDP have negative impacts. The wages variable
has a negative impact but in the majority of models, it is not significant.
The variables GDP growth rates, profit tax rates, FDI intensity and wages are sig-
nificant and have the expected impact on GVC participation in all three groups of
countries. The variable of investment in R&D is significant only for the EU-NMS; it
is not significant for EU15 or the entire EU28. We suppose that such investments are
crucial for the establishment of improved connections with other producers from dif-
ferent countries and that the level of investment in R&D in EU NMS is at a lower
level than in the EU15 which is why the obtained result was expected. In the different
models we have included the variables of FDI stock or flows: the FDI inward stock
variable is significant for the EU-NMS, it is not significant for the EU28, and it has
negative impact for the EU-15. We think that the variable FDI intensity is a better
measure because it comprises the inflows and outflows of FDI (in comparison with
GDP). Variables that refer to FDI have weak influence or no influence on the EU15
while for the EU-NMS their significance increases. For the EU-NMS, the FDI act as a
channel creating an interconnection between different producers from different coun-
tries. The variable private credit explains the financial development, but it does not
have the same influence: for the EU-28 and EU-15 it has a positive impact while for
the EU-NMS it has a negative impact. The share of services in GDP has a negative
impact on the countries’ participation in GVCs in the EU-28 and EU-15, while in the
EU-NMS it has a positive impact. The level of high-tech products in export has a
positive significant impact for the EU-15, while it has negative impact for EU-NMS
participation in GVCs.
The results in this paper refer to the GVC participation of the national economies,
and not to their specific sectors. The majority of significant variables have the
expected sign of influence. The existing level of GVC participation and the level of
development are the crucial variables for a positive impact on GVC participation.
These can be the result of MNC activities in EU member states that have already
taken place which buy and produce a lot of intermediate products thereby increasing
the participation of countries in GVCs. Also, the results confirm that the level of
labour costs (wages) is an important determinant of location of production (that is in
accordance with the FDI theory). We expected that financial development (measured
here with the variable domestic credit provided by the financial sector) should have a
stronger and more positive impact in all groups of countries, but the results point to
its importance just for the EU-15 and EU-28. This could be because the main con-
tributors of GVC participation of EU new member states are the EU-15 and they bor-
row on the domestic market, so the borrowing conditions on their markets are
important. The positive sign of private credit indicated that countries with better
financial development have relatively higher participation in GVCs in particular; the
countries have higher domestic value added. The negative impact on EU new mem-
ber states can be explained by their primarily receiving financial resources through
the FDI inflows; the financial system was not very developed (especially at the begin-
ning of the observed period), their systems were in the process of developing. In add-
ition, their indebtedness increased over the analysed period, so the shares of private
credit in GDP in some countries are near 300%, which is a very high level.
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The variable property rights is not significant in the EU-28 and the EU-15 because
the majority of EU members have already built strong institutional systems with a
solid guarantee of ownership rights, but it is an important variable in EU-NMS where
the regulations regarding this issue are more poorly developed.
4. Conclusion
The GVC participation index differs among EU member states, where the group of
EU core and EU new member states have higher indexes than the Southern members.
More specifically: Luxembourg, Slovakia and Hungary are the most integrated coun-
tries in GVCs, while Croatia is the least integrated.
With this research we have broadened the discussion on GVC participation to
include the analysis of its main drivers. According to economic theory and studies
that deal with foreign trade and/or FDI issues we chose to estimate the influence of
different variables covering the general macroeconomic indicators, variables that are
important for foreign investors in making decisions about the location of their invest-
ment and variables that determine the foreign trade.
We performed an analysis for the entire EU, and separately for the EU-15 and for
EU-NMS (new member states). The common findings are mostly in accordance with
our expectations: lag of GVC participation, GDP per capita or GDP growth rate have a
positive and significant impact on GVC participation; wages, profit tax rates have a nega-
tive impact. The variables FDI inward stock, FDI intensity have a strong influence on
GVC participation in EU-NMS while for the EU-28 they have a weaker influence. The
results are quite similar for the EU-15 and EU-NMS, and the differences are as expected,
as the new member states are more oriented to FDI inflows, which are the main drivers
of production. Also, for the EU-NMS higher investment in research and development
will create more sophisticated products that are involved in GVCs to a greater degree.
To be able to make more precise policy recommendations there is room for fur-
ther analysis, specifically regarding the industry level, which would pave the way for
further discussion on the differences between industries.
Notes
1. The value goes from 0 to 100, the higher the value the more open/liberalised/free
market/economies are.
2. We have included the logexport variable as the instrumental variable in all models.
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other parties.
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